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
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Prefatory Note

Systematic preparations for the greatest possible isolation and neutralization of Berlin and, specifically, West Berlin as a danger spot in the Soviet sphere of power and a thorn to Soviet authorities have been under way since the lifting of the Berlin blockade in May 1949 and, in some instances, have already been put to tests. As they are far advanced and as the isolation of Berlin seems to be due as a result of the recent development of Soviet policy toward East Germany, the order for their execution must be expected soon and specifically with ratification of the contractuals by West Germany probably determining the timing and serving as justification.

1. Specific items to be discussed in the following include:

- a. Measures both initiated and anticipated, to isolate West Berlin from the surrounding Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany and East Berlin;
- b. Measures taken, or planned, for isolating all of Berlin, including East Berlin, from the surrounding Soviet-Occupied Zone which may serve either as an alternative or a supplement to the aforementioned measures;
- c. Possible reasons for combining the measures mentioned in sections a and b from the viewpoint of a twofold security effort.

2. The practical possibilities of military measures to cut off supply and passenger traffic between West Berlin and West Germany remain undiscussed. The execution of such measures in the near future is discredited because of the following:

- a. These measures are unlikely inasmuch as they would primarily be directed against the occupation powers and would violate the Four-Power agreement dated 4 May and 20 June 1949 on free access

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to Berlin and the lifting of the traffic restrictions (also see SMA Order No 56 dated 12 May 1949) and, thus, would call for the immediate readiness for war on the part of the USSR. Further, there are no indications of a military blockade of supply channels between West Germany and West Berlin;

- b. These measures are unlikely because if they seriously threatened the existence of the people of West Berlin and, by their very type and extent, were more than mere provocations, they would touch on the reiterated security promises of the US and, thus, again presuppose that the USSR is prepared to run the ultimate risk;
- c. These measures are unlikely inasmuch as they would impair the authority of all Western Allies in West Berlin and would probably, therefore, considerably strengthen the will of these powers to resist aggression and thus, according to indications, be at variance with the present political intentions of the Kremlin;
- d. These measures are unlikely inasmuch as there are reasons for believing that the intensified isolation of Berlin, although to be anticipated as a countermove against ratification of the contractals, serves a different purpose from that of the blockade of 1948 and 1949. While that blockade had been instituted as a measure against the Western Powers and the establishment of the West German state, the present isolation effort stems from Soviet satellite policy toward East Germany since the fall of 1952 and, therefore, falls in the category of measures for the entire eastern bloc and not under that of a demonstration against the Western Powers;
- e. These measures are unlikely inasmuch as the extent, as well as the permanent nature, of the isolating measures taken around Berlin, which, between West Berlin and the Soviet Occupied Zone, become increasingly similar to those taken at the zonal border between the Soviet Zone and West Germany, would not be necessary if the arteries between West Berlin and West Germany were to be violated or cut off and West Berlin were, thus, to be eliminated as an espionage and propaganda center.

Present Situation and Tendencies

- 1. Isolation of West Berlin from East Berlin and the Soviet Zone
 - a. The boundaries between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany are 80 km. in length, and those between West Berlin and East Berlin about 45 km, while the official perimeter of West Berlin, its Weichbild, measures 115 km.

Preparations for sealing off West Berlin from the Soviet Zone are more advanced than those taken along the line dividing West Berlin from East Berlin. About 50 percent of the approximately 350 streets and roads crossing the border in this sector had already been blocked off or provided with slow-up barriers in the late summer

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of 1952. These measures have in the meantime been completed by the construction of additional road blocks and ditches, the tearing up of road surfaces, as well as the reinforcement of police forces on foot, for all practical purposes, traffic across this border section is possible only at the few rail and road check points. There is also increasing evidence that a strip of no man's land 10 meters wide and a security zone one kilometer in depth will be established between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone just as has been done along the zonal boundaries outside Berlin (B-line). In mid-January, work on the erection of a barbed wire fence was begun in wooded areas and those areas which are difficult to control. This fence will, allegedly, be continued around all of West Berlin at a distance from 500 to 1,000 meters from the zonal boundary, east of the parks, inns, and other installations which are usually frequented by a number of people were closed or moved to some other place. A total of four main roads and five secondary roads, which lead to West Berlin and vice versa, will apparently remain open for the time being, although they are being kept under strict control. These measures have forced all border traffic between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone if it does not strictly fall within the scope of official regulations to choose the route via East Berlin.

For technical and other reasons, the measures designed to isolate the western part of the city have lagged behind, although work on the blocking off, or the restricting, of guarded or unguarded crossing facilities has made continuous progress (there is at present a total of 60 street control points). All control facilities are further improved by the closing of house entries, erection of new road blocks, installation of spot lights, and the closing of shops, e.g., on Potsdamer Platz. Police personnel committed along the intracity boundary has been reinforced. A haphazard checking and arresting of people who have already crossed the zonal boundary is designed to increase the risk of entering East Berlin. It is, however, still possible to cross the zonal boundary in Berlin without having to go through the official check points.

- b. Profiting from experiences gained during the blockade of Berlin in 1948-1949, the Soviets, since 1949, have systematically prepared for an eventual splitting of the Berlin railroad system, including the elevated railroad (S-Bahn) and subway (U-Bahn) lines, to make the isolation of West Berlin more effective.

In 1950, a rail freight traffic control system was introduced and is still in force. Railroad construction projects connected with the intended isolation of West Berlin included the northern section of the Berlin Outer Freight Ring, which was completed in 1950, and the southern section of this freight ring, which was completed in 1951. In order to reroute S-Bahn traffic, the Nordring Berlin was completed in late 1952. The Nordwest Ring and the West Ring are scheduled to be built in 1953 and 1954.

Progress in the execution of the latter projects depends on the availability of construction materials. The original target of completion of the entire Ring around Berlin in 1953 had to be abandoned.

In conjunction with these construction measures, the railroad telephone network, the so-called Bann net, was reorganized in order to be independent of West Berlin. With the exception of certain equipment kept at Berlin-Mariensee, the entire rolling

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stock of the elevated railroad system is now being parked in East Berlin. Long-distance and S-Bahn operations are exclusively controlled from installations in the Eastern sector of the city.

In order to tighten control of passenger traffic and the inspection of luggage, special railroad check points are being constructed. It appears that two types of procedures are to be applied:

- (1) Passengers will be required to leave the train and go through a control point, while the train, after being searched, will be moved to another platform before the trip to West Berlin is continued.
- (2) Trains will terminate at the check points. This method, which would cut off West Berlin from all S-Bahn traffic, will probably be applied in the event of a complete isolation of West Berlin.

The construction work on these railroad check points continued after a temporary suspension in January 1953 and, according to unconfirmed information, was to be completed by 1 March. [redacted] new timetables based on an elimination of West Berlin were to be drawn up for the Berlin interurban railroad system by the same date.

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A northern canal bypass for inland shipping was established by the completion of the Paretz-Niederneuendorfer Canal. Road traffic is to be rerouted north of Berlin via Bernau, Oranienburg, Kremmen, and Nauen on a road 7.20 meters in width, the completion date of which was the fall of 1952. The completion of this road bypass has not been confirmed to date. Information received indicates that the railroad control system will be supplemented by check points for road and water traffic to and from West Berlin.

The previously uniform streetcar line system was also split into a West Berlin and an East Berlin system.

In summarizing, it may be stated that although measures designed to isolate West Berlin in the field of transportation have not yet been completed and the carrying capacity of rail, road, and water bypasses is still limited, it would now be possible to seal West Berlin by falling back on prepared emergency measures such as the utilization of buses for the handling of commuter traffic. This would entail, however, a number of difficulties and financial losses. On the basis of the present status, it is believed that an effective isolation of West Berlin will not be possible before late 1954.

- c. The long-distance telephone cables from the Soviet Zone of Germany to, or via Berlin, have been rerouted or rearranged in recent years in such a way that they no longer run through West Berlin. The Soviets would, therefore, be entirely independent in the field of telecommunications in the event of an isolation of West Berlin.

Preparations have also been made for cutting off all trunk cables from West Germany to West Berlin.

- d. No additional restrictions have been observed thus far in the field of documentation. They will, however, probably be imposed. West

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German and Berlin identity cards are still valid in East Berlin. West Berliners who work in the Eastern Sector of the city are required to have a factory pass and railroad workers must have a special railroad pass. Only officials of East German administrative agencies are prohibited from freely crossing the zonal boundary and are subjected to special restrictions. The crossing of the boundary between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone proper is subjected to similar control measures to those decreed for the crossing of the D-line. Details of these regulations have not been determined. West Berliners may enter the Soviet Zone only through the Eastern Sector of Berlin, where they must obtain official permits at specific Bezirksaemter.

The control of identity cards has been considerably tightened recently. Bearers of identity cards issued after 1 January 1950 are said to be checked in special "wanted" files. In many cases persons are subjected to preventive arrests in connection with these checks.

According to available information, it was expected that new identity cards restricting freedom of movement within the Soviet Zone would be issued by 1 March. Three types of identity cards are, allegedly, to be issued:

- (1) Identity cards for people living in East Berlin and employed there;
- (2) Identity cards for people living in the Soviet Zone and working in East Berlin;
- (3) Identity cards for persons who live and work in the Soviet Zone.

According to another version, the following three categories of identity cards are to be introduced:

- (1) Identity cards valid for the Soviet Zone, i.e. all East German territory outside the Berlin Outer Freight Ring;
- (2) Identity cards valid for Greater Berlin within the boundaries of the Outer Freight Ring;
- (3) Identity cards valid for Berlin (for the city area proper except for suburbs).

However, since an identity card is not a passport and its utilization as such would meet with legal difficulties, reports on the issuance of such classified identity cards must be received with reserve.

Other reports indicate that special passes authorizing East Berliners to enter the western parts of Berlin may be issued and that West Berliners working in the Eastern Sector of the city will be registered. The date of each crossing will, allegedly, be stamped on these special passes.

- e. No measures taken by the East German Ministry of State Security or the Soviet intelligence services in connection with an intensified complete isolation of West Berlin have been reported recently.

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The introduction of the so-called house lists and reports on the formation of an auxiliary police (one auxiliary policeman for each 800 inhabitants) may be mentioned here. These measures are, however, within the framework of a general tightening of control measures.

- f. The measures taken in the field of transportation have been paralleled in the field of public utilities, where preparations have been made for a splitting of the water and power supply systems since 1949. There is also a tendency to bring about a separation between the Western and Eastern Sectors of the city in the field of public services and in the labor market. The progress made in this sphere has, however, not been sufficient to guarantee an undisturbed functioning of public utilities and services in East Berlin after an isolation of the Western Sector of the city. A total of 47,000 West Berliners are, allegedly, still occupied in East Berlin. It is not known whether or not the East German authorities are ready to risk the economic difficulties which an isolation of West Berlin would entail for East Berlin under present conditions.

Numerous measures in almost all fields of the economy, particularly trade, customs, and currency regulations, taken for the integration of East Berlin with the Soviet Zone economy, have brought about sharp contrasts in the structure of East and West Berlin economies, while the previous differences in administration and structure of East Berlin and the Soviet Zone have been almost completely eliminated.

The offensive the Soviets initiated at the Moscow Economic Conference to eliminate obstacles in East-West trade relations must, on the other hand, be viewed as a factor not favoring an excessive isolation of West Berlin which is extremely useful as a transshipping point for increased East-West trade. The desire of extending the Soviet world trade system beyond the satellite states is also coupled with the necessity of importing strategic raw materials and products not available in the USSR. In this respect, West Berlin is believed to be even more important than Vienna as a trade center. In connection with these efforts to secure a sufficient supply of strategic materials for the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany appears to have been assigned a special role. This is apparent in the establishment of new foreign-trade agencies or the enlarging of existing agencies in East Berlin. Mention may be made of the establishment of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (Aussenhandelskammer), the Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (Kommittee zur Foerderung des Welthandels), the establishment of new DIA agencies and of special trade agencies designed to promote trade relations with the West, such as the MILITEX, the Deutsche Warenvertriebsgesellschaft (Commodity Exchange Company) among others. This development has been paralleled by the establishment, in West Berlin, of numerous Western trade agencies, which, to a certain extent, may be considered as extensions of the DIA organization.

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These measures indicate that the restrictions on trade between the eastern and western parts of Berlin do not essentially differ from trade policies regulating the flow of goods between sovereign Western countries. It is believed that, at least in the foreseeable future, it will not be in the interest of the East completely to isolate West Berlin economically. The ideal solution for the Soviets would probably be to stop the normal exchange of goods but leave the zonal boundary open for strictly controlled traffic in specific commodities. For the reason mentioned, the policy vis-a-vis West Berlin will probably be the result of a compromise between political requirements and security demands on one hand and economic interest on the other.

8. The boundary between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone is being guarded by personnel of the "Ring um Berlin" border-police force, which consists of the Bereitschaft Gross Glienicke and two thirds of the Blakenfelde Bereitschaft, a total of about 1,400 men. About six border police are permanently on duty on each one-km stretch of this boundary. Officials of the newly established Amt fuer Zollkontrolle und Warenpruefung (Customs and Goods Control Office), in addition to personnel of the State Security Police and the Transportation Police, are assigned to the most important border crossing points. Four Soviet MGB battalions, each of about 400 men, have been stationed at Gross Glienicke, Weissensee, Koepenick, and Teltow. They patrol the zonal border and control the East German security forces employed there.

The intra-city zonal boundaries are guarded by Bereitschaftskommandos I and II of the East Berlin VP Headquarters. The two Bereitschaftskommandos consist of a total of 1,300 men. Assuming an eight-hour round of duty per day, each km stretch of the zonal boundary in Berlin is being guarded by about 10 VPs.

Police operations designed to isolate West Berlin completely could be made effective only after a considerable increase of police forces and an authorization for VP personnel to fire at persons who do not stop when so ordered in a special restricted zone.

The following additional VP personnel could be made available for guard duties along the zonal boundaries in Berlin:

Police School in Koepenick	about	300 men
Guard Battalion of the HVDVP	about	800 men
Guard Regiment of the Ministry of State Security	about	2,500 men
Guard Battalion of the HVKVP	about	300 men
Einsatzkommandos of the Schutzpolizei assigned to the Police Headquarters	about	400 men
Total	about	4,300 men.

By utilizing this personnel, the density of border guard forces committed along the zonal boundary could be increased to about 20 VPs per kilometer.

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It is also possible that personnel from border police units employed on the northern, eastern, and southern borders of East Germany will be used to increase the security belt around Berlin. A transfer of KVP units into the Berlin area appears improbable because such a measure would detrimentally affect the training program and the current organization of East German army units.

Soviet army divisions stationed in a twenty-km perimeter around the boundaries of West Berlin include the 10th Gds Tank Div and elements of the 25th Tank Div; the 1st Mecz Div and elements of the 6th Gds Mecz Div; the 34th Arty Div; and the 31st AAA Div. Soviet army units available within a perimeter of 50 km around West Berlin include the 10th and 12th Gds Tank Divs and the 25th Tank Div; the 1st Mecz Div and the 6th, 7th and 14th Gds Mecz Divs, the 34th Arty Div; and the 2d Gds and 31st AAA Divs.

The employment of Soviet Army units for border control missions in Berlin would involve the risk of border violations and incidents which may be considered undesirable by the Soviets, particularly if they should occur too frequently. Such missions would, moreover, bring the Soviet divisions, which have a fair share of young recruits, into contact with the Western world, increase the quota of deserters, and disturb the current training program. It is possible, however, that border patrol activities by Soviet Army units will be increased and that demonstrative field exercises will be held near the border to back up the East German police units employed along the zonal border.

Since border-control missions were taken over by the East German Ministry of State Security in May 1952, the border control has continuously been tightened and the strength of the "Ring um Berlin" border police forces has been increased slightly. Apart from this, there are, at present, no indications of an imminent and considerable reinforcement of the military security belt around Berlin. Employment of additional police (VP and SFD) personnel available in Berlin would make it possible to have every kilometer of the border line guarded by 20 VPs and thus tighten security measures to an extent that illegal crossing of the zonal border in Berlin would become almost impossible or, at least, extremely difficult.

The transfer of the headquarters of the Group of Forces, Germany, from Potsdam-Babelsberg, close to West Berlin, to Zossen-Wuensdorf in the summer of 1952 had already been an indication that Soviet military leadership was expecting a tightening of control measures along the zonal boundary.

Summarizing, it can be stated that, in the event of an isolation of West Berlin, the present security measures will probably be increased by the assignment to border control duties of additional VP personnel and units of the Ministry of State Security, by the construction of additional obstacles and barriers and, possibly, also by a freer use of firearms. It may be expected that Soviet Army units will be employed for increased patrol activities along the zonal boundary and for demonstrative exercises in the border area. It appears improbable, however, that they will be assigned regular control duties on the boundary itself.

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2. Isolation of the Entire City: East Berlin, from the Soviet Zone.

- a. Not reckoning small recesses, the boundaries between Berlin and the Soviet Zone are about 140 km in length, while the official perimeter of the city (Weichbild) measures 230 km. The boundaries between the Eastern Sector of the city and the Soviet Zone are about 140 km in length (Weichbild: 113 km).

Recent reports furnished increasing evidence that the dividing line between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone was also being secured by wire entanglements, road blocks, slow-up barriers, and similar obstacles to make possible the crossing of this line only at a few control points. Persons attempting to evade these check stations by walking across the fields were stopped by patrols. Control at the main crossing points was tightened. For the time being, it is still possible, although now more difficult, to cross the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone illegally. Even tighter controls must be expected.

- b. Available information indicates that the new control system for railroad traffic between East and West Berlin, as described in paragraph 1 b, is also being prepared for the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone to provide additional control for traffic between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone via East Berlin. For rail and road check points on this sector of the zonal boundaries, see Annex 2.
- c. No information on unusual measures taken along the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone has been received on telecommunications. This is only natural, because there would be no reason for East German authorities to interrupt telephone lines in this sector since the control of cables and other communication lines should offer no difficulties.
- d. The control of identity papers has been considerably tightened on the boundaries of East Berlin. Persons who want to enter East Berlin from the Soviet Zone must show an official travel order in addition to their German identity card. If they are unable to produce a travel order, or if their travel order has not been made out correctly, they will be subjected to irregular and wearisome investigations with inquiries made at the places of destination or home towns given. Persons who buy railroad tickets to East Berlin have the numbers of their identity cards registered. Persons travelling to East Berlin from the outskirts of the city are only required to be provided with an identity card with the photograph of the bearer. Persons entering or leaving East Berlin will be entered into lists. Since 4 February 1952, students of the Potsdam Institute of Technology have been forbidden to enter Berlin.

While East Berliners could travel to the Soviet Zone on the German identity card, the introduction of the abovementioned categories of identity cards would make it possible to restrict the movement of persons from East Berlin to the Soviet Zone.

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Generally, it may be stated that the Eastern system of documentation and controls is characterized by an absence of clear-cut rules and an apparent arbitrariness. Properly speaking, there is no definite system at all and, thus, a general insecurity and a method of exposure to risks which, as in other spheres, the Soviets apply with undeniable success.

It may be mentioned that the tightening of controls on the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone was probably also motivated by the desire to deter people from fleeing to West Berlin or to intercept as many of these refugees as possible prior to entering East Berlin.

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- f. As mentioned above, the integration of East Berlin with the Soviet Zone has systematically been advanced in recent years in the field of economics, supply and administration. This represents the most effective check to all tendencies of overdoing the controls along the boundary. There are no indications that the present status will be changed basically or that such a change would be feasible. Complete merger of the Soviet Zone and Berlin into one economic and administrative unit must, on the contrary, still be considered one of the chief objectives of the Soviet Zone regime and finds only a certain limitation in the well considered recognition which the Eastern regime formally gives to the special status of the city of Berlin.

Besides the necessity of maintaining at least a minimum of supply and professional traffic, the presence in East Berlin of the central government and administrative agencies has been one of the main factors which ruled out the feasibility of too great a restriction of traffic between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone. There have, however, been recurrent rumors and unconfirmed reports that East Berlin ministries and other central administrative agencies would move to a place in the Soviet Zone. Last year, for instance, it was reported that some ministries would, allegedly, move to the Erzgebirge; in early 1953, it was rumored that government agencies would be transferred from East Berlin to Frankfurt/Oder, and more recent press reports stated that the East German government planned to move to Dresden and Halle.

The execution of such measures would basically change the position of East Berlin and also favor the clamping down of the iron curtain on the boundary between this sector of the city and the Soviet Zone.

- g. From a military point of view, the situation on the boundaries between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone is as follows:

Three Bereitschaften of the Former Police are assigned to the "Ring um Berlin". They are stationed in Gross Glienicke, Blankenfelde and Plumburg. Their total strength is 2,500 to 3,000 men. They are chiefly employed for duty at 23 main control points on

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the most important traffic routes. Assuming an eight-hour round of duty, seven VPs are available per border kilometer on the boundary, which is furthermore patrolled by the four Soviet MGB battalions mentioned in paragraph 1 g.

The police forces employed in this control belt could be reinforced by border police from the northern, eastern and southern borders of the Soviet Zone. It is believed that up to 1,500 border police could be made available without any major detrimental effects on the border protection.

Given the tightened isolation of East Berlin from the Soviet Zone, there would be no need for the employment of military units. The reinforcement of the police units employed along the Ring um Berlin would make it possible to guard each kilometer of the zonal boundary by 10 VPs permanently. In conjunction with technical measures such as the installation of spot lights, the utilization of electrically charged wire entanglements, the evacuation of buildings close to the border, and a freer use of firearms, these police forces would make illegal traffic across the border almost impossible.

Besides the construction of permanent accommodations for border police personnel employed around Berlin and a slight reinforcement of these police units there are no further indications of military preparations for an imminent isolation of East Berlin from the Soviet Zone. The observation that central VP headquarters recently changed their locations in East Berlin supports this over-all estimate of the situation.

3. The following reasons favor the assumption that, depending on circumstances and possibilities, an increased isolation of West Berlin would be paralleled by a tightening of control measures on the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone:
 - a. The advantages of a double control belt are evident. As soon as the measures envisaged to isolate West Berlin completely from the Soviet Zone go into effect, all passenger traffic from West Berlin to the Soviet Zone and vice versa will have to go through East Berlin. Travelers will then have to cross two strictly controlled lines besides passing through East Berlin, which is permanently patrolled by VP guards. Security measures taken along the intracity boundaries would then effectively be supplemented by the controls established on the dividing line between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone, which is especially important inasmuch as the guarding of the intracity boundaries meets with great difficulties as a result of the peculiar conditions prevailing in the city and, specifically, the impossibility of establishing a prohibited area deep enough to prevent illegal border crossing.

The measures the East German authorities took to reduce the number of East Germans fleeing to the West indicate that they fully recognized the advantages of the existence of an advanced control line on the boundaries between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone. The difficulties which, in all spheres of life and the field of control, would arise

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from a continued unlimited access to East Berlin after an isolation of West Berlin also make it highly probable that the tightening of control measures against West Berlin would be paralleled by measures on the boundaries between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

- b. Political reasons must also be taken into account. In spite of certain economic advantages, which the present status of West Berlin offers to the East, West Berlin must, in the long run, be considered a grave menace to the Soviet regime and an intolerable enclave within the area of a totally Sovietized state. It must, therefore, be the policy of the Soviets, whose sensitivity to contacts with non-Soviet regimes is well known (and characteristic of all dictatorships), to accelerate the incorporation of all of Berlin, particularly after the failure of their plans for neutralizing the whole of Germany.

Since, however, too brutal a procedure against West Berlin, which could not be brought into at least formal agreement with the present legal status of the city, would rather stiffen the attitude of the Western powers and might lead to war, it is believed that this line of action is not at present intended by the Soviets.

It is more probable that by isolating West Berlin from the Eastern parts of the city, they will try to bring about a modification of the status of Berlin and create the conditions for its eventual Sovietization via its demilitarization, neutralization, and administrative reunification. The effectiveness of such a policy would presuppose the existence of a tight control along the boundaries between West Berlin and the remainder of the city as well as between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone. Such a procedure would be another version of the well known Soviet policy of simultaneously operating along two lines as it has been practiced in the Kremlin's German policy, exerting, on the one hand, pressure and attempting to demoralize the Western partners with a view to making the maintenance of the status quo appear unprofitable and, at the same time, making alluring offers regarding reunification after the Communication of the Soviet-occupied UNCODED's been pushed sufficiently far to exclude all risks in this respect and after all steps have been taken to exploit to the maximum possible degree all the advantages of the new situation. If these offers, which are basically unacceptable, are rejected, the Soviets consider this a justification for more radical measures in their domain and the exertion of greater pressure in violation of legal obligations entered into. The proclamation of the Berlin SED headquarters issued on 11 February 1952 and published in the press illustrates these methods for the concrete case of Berlin.

It appears that, for the time being at least, the West will have to pay the bill of such a procedure. However, the present food crisis in East Germany, although it may have been to a certain extent manufactured for political reasons, and the increasing numbers of refugees seeking asylum in West Berlin show that Soviet schemes may also backfire. At any rate, the pressure the Soviets exert against West Berlin underlines the importance of this outpost of the Western world and the dangerous attraction it has for the population of the Soviet Zone.

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Summary of Analysis

1. Measures designed to seal off West Berlin, which at present is the most conspicuous gap in the iron curtain, are believed to be imminent. They must be viewed in connection with the growing Sovietization of East Germany since the fall of 1952 and within the framework of a policy which is directed at the intensified isolation of the Eastern bloc and the continuation of purges. It appears, however, that, in its endeavor to start and exploit international crises, the Soviet policy still fears to run the risk of war.
2. There are indications that the Soviets will soon interdict all direct access from their zone to West Berlin, taking measures similar to those in force along the D-line, and will bring all traffic to the Western part of the city under the strictest control, establishing control lines at the boundaries between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone on the one hand and East Berlin and West Berlin on the other. An elimination of West Berlin from the East German and city railroad systems would entail certain difficulties in the existing traffic system and financial losses to the amount of approximately two million westmarks per year but is possible. Through-traffic of the S-Bahn across the border will in any event be suspended, and a system will be initiated that has already been tested at the Friedrich Strasse railroad station. The underground railroad system of the city will probably be split as was the system of streetcar lines. The latter measure would not be so effective as those expected for the elevated railroad system, because West Berlin would be in a position to operate its own subway lines.
3. The East German authorities will probably put up with certain economic difficulties which arise from a far reaching interruption of traffic between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone. If there is a necessity to choose between the security and the homogeneity of their system and economic advantages, the Soviets have never wavered to decide themselves in favor of the monolithic structure of their régime. Both military and economic realities, however, and particularly the need for certain categories of specialists from West Berlin, will for the time being rule out a complete isolation of West Berlin. It is not yet clear what categories of persons will be given the permission to cross the zonal boundaries in Berlin and what will be the scope of legal traffic and exchange of services approved by the East German authorities.
4. The measures taken along the boundary between East Berlin and the Soviet Zone will probably be restricted to an elimination of all undesired traffic and to a tightening of controls. They will also be designed to prevent East Germans from fleeing to the West. The effectiveness of these control measures could be very much increased after the transfer of central government and administrative agencies from Berlin to places in the Soviet Zone. There are some indications that this transfer is possible. The increase of control measures around the entire city would agree with the fiction of the existence of a uniform status for all of Berlin and might pave the way for a revision of this status, which is perhaps desired by the Soviets.
5. The isolation of West Berlin in the way described will be coupled with increased chicanery and difficulties for the supply of West Berlin from West Germany which, however, will probably not exceed the scope of local incidents and will respect at least the letter of international obligations.

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Simultaneous changes in the inner structure of the East German state which are expected in connection with the isolation of West Berlin are beyond the scope of this study.

6. It has been reported that preparations for sealing off West Berlin were to be completed by 1 March. As it appears plausible that the Soviets wanted to have these measures completed in advance of the date fixed for the isolation of West Berlin, the tightening of control measures will probably be put into effect after the ratification of the SDC Treaty, i.e. in April or May. The isolation of West Berlin will hardly be effected in the form of a single large-scale operation but rather in the form of a continuous process which has already started and will be accelerated in steps in accordance with political conditions. Individual acts of violence against "centers of espionage and diversionism" in West Berlin are, of course, possible at any time.

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